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Guaranteeing Loans to Clients Under Minnesota's
Code of Professional Responsibility
I. INTRODUCTION
On November 6, 1981, the Minnesota Supreme Court
amended Disciplinary Rule (DR) 5-103(B)' of Minnesota's
Code of Professional Responsibility,2 allowing attorneys to
guarantee loans to clients for reasonable living expenses during the pendency of a lawsuit.3 The new rule rectifies an anomalous situation. Under the old rule, an attorney generally was
prohibited from advancing or guaranteeing financial assistance
to a client.4 The drafters of the Code apparently believed that
such activities would result in an attorney acquiring an interest
in the litigation 5 that might impair the exercise of the attor1. Minnesota Supreme Court Order No. 46994, Nov. 6, 1981, N.W.2d Advance Sheet XXX (Dec. 29, 1981) (codified at 52 Mmn. STAT. ANN. 21 (West
Supp. 1982)).
2. 9 MwN. STAT. 709 (1980). The Minnesota Supreme Court in 1970 incorporated by reference the American Bar Association Model Code of Professional
Responsibility. 286 Minn. ix (1970). Prior to the 1981 amendment, the Court
had amended the Code four times. See BENCH & BAR, July-Aug. 1980, at 5; 310
Minn. ix (1978); 303 Minn. xvi (1976); 301 Minn. xxxv (1975). This Note will cite
to the Minnesota Code of Professional Responsibility and will refer to the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility when the relevant language differs
from the Minnesota Code.
3. DR 5-103(B) (2) provides:
A lawyer may guarantee a loan reasonably needed to enable the client
to withstand delay in litigation that would otherwise put substantial
pressure on the client to settle a case because of financial hardship
rather than on the merits, provided the client remains ultimately liable
for repayment of the loan without regard to the outcome of the litigation and, further provided, that no promise of such financial assistance
was made to the client by the lawyer, or by another in his behalf, prior
to the employment of that lawyer by that client.
MINN. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmILxr

DR 5-103(B) (2), 52 MIN. STAT.

ANN. 21 (West Supp. 1982).
4. DR 5-103(B) providech
While representing a client in connection with contemplated or pending litigation, a lawyer shall not advance or guarantee financial assistance to his client, except a lawyer may advance or guarantee the
expenses of litigation, including court costs, expenses of investigation,
expenses of medical examination, and costs of obtaining and presenting evidence, provided the client remains ultimately liable for such
expenses.
Id. DR 5-103(B), 9 Mim. STAT. 731 (1980).
5. Id. DR 5-103(A), 9 MwN. STAT. 728 (1980).
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ney's professional judgment on behalf of a client. 6 Nevertheless, the Code recognized that, without some financial
assistance from counsel, a potential client with a good cause of
7
action might be unable to afford to litigate his or her claim.
The Code therefore condoned arrangements such as contingent
fee contracts 8 and loans for the expenses of litigation, 9 under
which an attorney invested resources in the case and looked to
the proceeds of the suit for reimbursement.
Financial assistance for living expenses, however, was not
permitted.' 0 Although an indigent client might require an attorney's financial assistance during the preparation and trial of
the case, the Code drew an arbitrary distinction between permissible loans for litigation expenses and contingent fee contracts, and financial assistance for living expenses. Because an
attorney acquired an interest in the litigation under each of
these three practices, the lack of a more specific justification for
the prohibition of subsistence loans made the old rule particularly inequitable. Minnesota therefore amended DR 5-103 to accord similar treatment to all three arrangements."
This Note traces the historical development of the prohibition of financial assistance by attorneys. The Note then examines the legitimacy of this prohibition. Finally, the Note
discusses the desirability of the amendment allowing loan
guarantees, identifies potential problems in its application, and
suggests guidelines to ensure ethical loanmaking activity.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROHIBITION
OF SUBSISTENCE LOANS
A.

THE COMMON

LAw RULE

The broad prohibition in DR 5-103(B), which forbids attorneys to advance or guarantee financial assistance to their clients, has been called the last major vestige of the law's
traditional condemnation of champerty.12 The proscription
6. Id. EC 5-7, 5-8, 9 Mi-N. STAT. 728 (1980).
7. Id.
8. Id. DR 5-103 (A) (2), 9 MINN. STAT. 731 (1980).
9. Id. DR 5-103(B), 9 Mim. STAT. 731 (1980). See supra note 4.
10. See MIEN. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSMrrY DR 5-103(B), 9 MINN.
STAT. 731 (1980); supra note 4.
11. Minnesota Supreme Court Order No. 46994, Nov. 6, 1981, N.W.2d Advance Sheet XXX (Dec. 29, 1981) (codified at 52 MimN. STAT. ANN. 21 (West
Supp, 1982)).
12. Findlater, The Proposed Revision of DR 5-103(B): Champerty and Class
Actions, 36 Bus. LAw. 1667, 1667 (1981).
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against champerty developed in England during the 13th and
14th centuries in response to uniquely medieval problems13
and was not traditionally directed at attorneys.14 In that respect, the medieval offense was quite distinct from its modern
counterpart.15
Many American courts' 6 condemned a fee arrangement as
champertous when an attorney agreed to conduct the litigation
at his or her own expense in return for a portion of the proceeds of the lawsuit.' 7 These courts justified the condemnation
of such fee arrangements by concluding that a broad prohibition was necessary "to prevent officious intermeddlers from
stirring up strife and contention by vexatious or speculative litigation."' 8 The courts therefore held that an attorney who bore
the cost of a client's lawsuit committed champerty.19 An attorney could, however, loan money to a client while litigation was
pending, but only if the advances were made pursuant to an express or implied agreement for repayment. 20 The traditional
rule condoned both loans "necessary to carry on the suit"2 1 and
13. Champerty was a particular species of the broader offense of maintenance. The essence of maintenance was the intervention of powerful feudal
lords in lawsuits in which they had no direct interest. Such intervention distorted the administration of justice in the king's court. Champerty and maintenance developed against a background of clerical opposition to litigation. A
common theme of the prohibitions, therefore, was the policy against encouraging litigation. See Radin, Maintenance by Champerty, 24 CALIF. L REV. 48, 60-66
(1935).
14. "[W]hen these words [-maintainers and champertors-were] first
used.. ., they were not supposed to refer primarily to lawyers, but-rather to
men of property who speculated in the results of litigation or to feudal magnates who supported an army of retainers." Id. at 67.
15. See id. at 66.
16. Some jurisdictions in the United States accepted the common law doctrine prohibiting champerty; some accepted the doctrine in a modified form;
others never accepted it at all. CYCLOPEDIA OF LAw AND PROCEDURE 854-55
(1903). Courts tended, however, to relax the common law doctrine to permit
greater freedom of contract between attorney and client, because the peculiar
conditions giving rise to the doctrine no longer existed. See Courtright v.
Burnes, 13 F. 317, 320 (C.C.W.D. Mo. 1881).
17. See, e.g., Peck v. Heurich, 167 U.S. 624 (1897) (construing the law of the
District of Columbia).
18. Huber v. Johnson, 68 Minn. 74, 78, 70 N.W. 806, 807 (1897).
19. Sapp v. Davids, 176 Ga. 265, 268-70, 168 S.E. 62, 64-65 (1933); Omaha &
Republican Valley Ry. v. Brady, 39 Neb. 27, 48-50, 57 N.W. 767, 772-75 (1894).
20. Northwestern S.S. Co. v. Cochran, 191 F. 146, 152 (9th Cir. 1911); People
ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. McCallum, 341 1l. 578, 589, 173 N.E. 827, 831 (1930);
Ryan v. Pennsylvania R.R., 268 Ill. App. 364, 374-76 (1932); Johnson v. Great N.
Ry., 128 Minn. 365, 369, 151 N.W. 125, 127 (1915); Pottier v. Ajax Mining Co., 22
Utah 273, 290-91, 61 P. 999, 1003 (1900).
21. Potter v. Ajax Mining Co., 22 Utah 273, 289-90, 61 P. 999, 1002-03 (1900)
(monetary advances used to commence suit and pay officers and witnesses).

1094

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:1091

those required by a client for living expenses during the suit.22
Although loans subject to repayment survived the challenge of champerty, their propriety was still suspect unless the
client retained the attorney before receiving the loan. 23 Courts

were concerned that attorneys might use loans to induce either
the employment relationship 24 or the pursuit of the claim. 2 5
Nevertheless, if the client remained liable for repayment of the
loan and the agreement was made after the attorney's retention, the courts consistently recognized the necessity and desirability of allowing such loans.26 As one court remarked: "Thus
a man in indigent circumstances is enabled to obtain justice in
a case where without such aid he would be unable to enforce a
27
just claim."
B. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICs
Although not frequently cited by the courts,2 8 several canons in the American Bar Association's Code of Professional
Ethics as originally enacted 29 were consistent with the existing
22. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. McCallum, 341 IM. 578, 589, 173 N.E.
827, 831 (1930) (advanced living expenses to needy clients); Ryan v. Pennsylvania R.R., 268 Ill. App. 364, 374-76 (1932) (advances to client who was "very
sorely in need"); Johnson v. Great N. Ry., 128 Minn. 365, 369, 151 N.W. 125, 127
(1915) (monetary advances to cover client's living expenses during the litigation); Bristol v. Dann, 12 Wend. 142, 144 (N.Y. 1834) (monetary advances, made
"from motives of humanity and benevolence," to help client support his family
and to prevent his being taken to jail on small executions).
23. See, e.g., Hildebrand v. State Bar of Cal., 18 Cal. 2d 816, 824, 117 P.2d 860,
864 (1941) (loan made by an attorney to a client was "of slight importance"
since it was made after the attorney was retained).
24. See, e.g., Fail v. Gulf States Steel Co., 205 Ala. 148, 151, 87 So. 612, 614
(1920); In re McDonald, 204 Minn. 61, 63, 72, 282 N.W. 677, 679, 683 (1938); In re
Sizer, 306 Mo. 356, 375, 267 S.W. 922, 928 (1924); In re Gilman, 251 N.Y. 265, 269-70,
167 N.E. 437, 439 (1929); Bristol v. Dann, 12 Wend. 142, 144 (N.Y. 1834).
25. See Mytton v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 211 S.W. 111, 113 (Mo. Ct. App. 1919).
26. E.g., Northwestern S.S. Co. v. Cochran, 191 F. 146, 152 (9th Cir. 1911); In
re Gilman, 251 N.Y. 265, 270, 167 N.E. 437, 439 (1929); Bristol v. Dann, 12 Wend.
142, 144 (N.Y. 1834).
27. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. McCallum, 341 ll. 578, 589, 173 N.E.
827, 831 (1930).
28. But see id. at 589-90, 173 N.E. at 831; In re McDonald, 204 Minn. 61, 71,
282 N.W. 677, 682 (1938); State ex rel. Neb. Bar Ass'n v. Rein, 141 Neb. 758, 765, 4
N.W.2d 829, 832 (1942). The McCallum and McDonald opinions suggest a possible explanation for the judiciary's limited use of the canons. Both courts qualified their reliance upon the canons by noting that the American Bar
Association was not a legislative tribunal and, therefore, its Canons of Ethics
were not enforced as binding obligations by the courts.
29. The original thirty-two canons, based on the Alabama State Bar Association's 1887 Code of Ethics, were approved at the 1908 meeting of the American
Bar Association. In 1928, canons 33 through 45 were adopted and canon 28 was
amended. In 1933, canon 46 was adopted and canons 11, 13, 34, 35, and 43 were
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common law rule. By forbidding an attorney's purchase of any
interest in the subject matter of a lawsuit, canon 1030 prohibited
3
attorneys from making champertous agreements. 1 The canon
therefore reflected the common law's requirement that the cli32
Caent be ultimately responsible for the costs of litigation.
nons 27 and 28 prohibited attorneys from "seeking out those
with claims... in order to secure them as clients" 3 3 or soliciting "business ... by personal communications."3 4 These
prohibitions corresponded to the courts' concern that the loan
be made after the attorney's retention to eliminate its potential
effect as an inducement to employment.35 Although the canons
did not specifically address the propriety of loans for living expenses, one court analogized such loans to advances for examended. In 1937, canon 47 was adopted and canons 7, 11, 12, 27, 31, 33, 34, 37,
39, and 43 were amended. Thereafter, individual canons were occasionally
amended but the ABA did not reexamine the canons as a whole and consider a
possible revision until 1958. AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMIrTEE ON CANONS OF ETHIcs 6-7 (1958) (discussing enactment of the
canons). The canons, therefore, reflected the conscience of the profession in
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and remained the governing standard of conduct until January 1, 1970 when the current Code of Professional Responsibility became effective. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSMILrrY (1980).
30. "The lawyer should not purchase any interest in the subject matter of
the litigation which he is conducting." ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHMcS
No. 10 (1908).
31. Note, Loans to Clientsfor Living Expenses, 55 CALIF. L. REv. 1419, 1422
n.20 (1967).
32. The vague command in canon 10 prohibited attorneys from engaging in
two activities. Attorneys were forbidden from purchasing all or part of a claim
for purposes of speculation. The prohibition thus prevented an attorney, with
his or her superior ability to estimate the value of a claim, from taking advantage of a client who was ignorant of the claim's true value and possibly in immediate financial need. In addition, the canon forbade attorneys to agree to
bear the expenses of a suit in return for a share of the recovery. The Code prohibited this conduct to prevent the prosecution of questionable claims, which
would not arise but for the attorney's assumption of expenses. Id. at 1434-37.
33. It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a lawsuit .... Stirring up strife and litigation is not only unprofessional,
but it is indictable at common law. It is disreputable to hunt up...
causes of action and inform thereof in order to be employed to bring
suit, or to breed litigation by seeking out those with claims... in order
to secure them as clients ....
ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETmIcs No. 28 (1908).
34. The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a
young lawyer, and especially with his brother lawyers, is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity
to trust. This cannot be forced, but must be the outcome of character
and conduct .... [S]olicitation of business by circulars or advertisements, or by personal communications or interviews, not warranted by
personal relations, is unprofessional.
ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 27 (1908).
35. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
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penses of litigation36 permitted under canon 42.37
Notwithstanding the courts' consistent approval of loans
for living expenses, in 1925 the Committee on Professional Ethics of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York issued
its first of five advisory opinions condemning such loans as professionally improper.38 In response to an attorney's inquiry
concerning the propriety of loaning money to an unemployed,
destitute client to prevent his "actual physical suffering," the
39
Committee concluded that such loans would be improper.
The Committee feared that loanmaking attorneys would acquire an undue personal interest in the subject matter of the
litigation that would be inconsistent with the client's control of
the suit.40 Even if the loan were made to an existing client, the
Committee also believed that such loans might nevertheless
have induced the attorney's employment.4 1
In a later opinion, the Committee qualified its broad condemnation, stating simply that loans for living expenses were
not improper in "sporadic instances," provided that neither the
loan nor the expectation of the loan induced or influenced the
retainer.4 The Committee subsequently ignored its exception
for infrequent loans and reiterated its concern that even an isolated loan might induce a client to employ a particular attorney.43 Citing canon 29,44 the Committee warned that loans to
support a destitute client would impair the dignity of the profession. 45 In addition, the Committee reasoned that because
36. People ex tel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. McCallum, 341 IlM. 578, 589, 173 N.E.
827, 831 (1930).
37. "A lawyer may not properly agree with a client that the lawyer shall
pay or bear the expenses of litigation; he may in good faith advance expenses
as a matter of convenience, but subject to reimbursement." ABA CANONS OF
PROFESSIONAL ETmcs No. 42 (1928).
38. Bar Ass'n of the City of New York, Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op.
20 (1925).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Bar Ass'n of the City of New York, Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op.
391 (1936).
43. Bar Ass'n of the City of New York, Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op.
779, Op. 781 (1953). See also Bar Ass'n of the City of New York, Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 319 (1934).
44. Bar Ass'n of the City of New York, Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op.
779 (1953). Canon 29 provides that lawyers "should strive at all times to uphold
the honor and to maintain the dignity of the profession and to improve not only
the law but the administration of justice." ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETH-

iCs No. 29 (1908).
45. Bar Ass'n of the City of New York, Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op.
779 (1953).
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repayment of the proposed loan presumably was contingent on
the success of the lawsuit, the loanmaldng lawyer would essentially finance the litigation in violation of canons 28 and 42.46
In 1954, the American Bar Association's Committee on Professional Ethics followed the New York City Bar Association's
departure from the common law rule and issued Advisory
Opinion 288,47 prohibiting loans for living expenses.48 The opinion justified the prohibition on several grounds. The Committee explained that permissible expenses of litigation under
canon 42 referred only to "court costs, witness fees and expenses resulting from the conduct of the litigation itself."49 Advances for any other purpose, although not explicitly prohibited
by canon 42, were therefore improper.50 The Committee also
condemned subsistence loans because the lending attorney
would acquire an interest in the subject matter of the litigation
in violation of canon 10,51 and the loan would violate canon 652
by creating a conflict of interest between attorney and client.
In addition, if the practice were publicized, the loan would constitute an improper inducement for employment in violation of
canon 27.53
The drastic departure from the existing case law in Opin46. Id. Although the attorney argued in Opinion 779 that the client would
earn a fairly substantial sum of money once he returned to work and "could
very readily repay the loans involved," the Committee found that this fact did
not change its conclusion that the loan would be improper. Id.
47. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 288
(1954), reprintedin 41 A.B. J. 33 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Formal Op. 2881.
48. Id.
49. Id.; see supra note 37.
50. Formal Op. 288, supra note 47, reprintedin 41 A.B.A. J. 33, 33 (1955).
51. Id.; see supra note 30.
52. Formal Op. 288, supra note 47, reprinted in 41 A.B.
J. 33, 38 (1955).
Canon 6, entitled "Adverse Influences and Conflicting Interests," provided:
It is the duty of a lawyer at the time of retainer to disclose to the client
all the circumstances of his relations to the parties, and any interest in
or connection with the controversy, which might influence the client in
the selection of counsel.
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests except by express consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
Within the meaning of this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for that
which duty to another client requires him to oppose.
The obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity and
not to divulge his secrets or confidences forbids also the subsequent
acceptance of retainers or employment from others in matters adversely affecting any interest of the client with respect to which confidence has been reposed.
ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHics No. 6 (1908).

53. Formal Op. 288, supra note 47, reprintedin 41 A.BA J. 33, 38 (1955); see
supra note 34.

1098

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:1091

ion 288 engendered confusion and inconsistency among the
courts. The court in El Janny v. Cleveland Tankers, Inc.,54 for
example, after quoting Opinion 288 at great length, concluded
that loans for any purpose other than "costs connected with the
actual prosecution of a case" were improper.55 In In re Moore,56
the Illinois Supreme Court held, without mentioning Opinion
288, that an attorney who advanced money to his client to "help
him out" did not violate canon 42.57 In allowing the loans, the
court explained they were neither a means of solicitation nor
associated with an agreement to purchase an interest in the litigation.58 The Kansas Supreme Court in In re Ratner 59 acknowledged Opinion 288's interpretation of canon 42, but
nonetheless held that an attorney who guaranteed bank loans
for his needy clients was not acting improperly.6 0 The court
concluded that because the bank loans were valid legal obligations not contingent on the successful prosecution of the claim,
such loans did not constitute an unethical acquisition of an interest in the subject matter of the litigation. 6 ' Moreover, the
evidence did not support the inference that the attorney's willingness to guarantee loans improperly induced his
62
employment.
Courts sometimes disagreed about the propriety of an identical loan arrangement. The Ohio Supreme Court suspended
an attorney from practice because he advanced small sums of
money for living expenses to two recently widowed clients pursuing claims against a railroad for the deaths of their hus54. 209 F. Supp. 91 (N.D. Ind. 1962) (attorney advanced a total of $5,000, allegedly for living and medical expenses, $1,200 of which was used to finance a
trip to Lebanon for the client's wife and children).
55. Id. at 94.
56. 8 ll. 2d 373, 134 N.E.2d 324 (1956).
57. Id. at 381-82, 134 N.E.2d at 328.
58. Id. at 381, 134 N.E.2d at 328. In Moore, an attorney advanced approximately $400 to his client, who was also the sole eyewitness to an accident in
which another client was killed. The money was intended to pay another attorney to get the client out of jail, to help the client at the time of his marriage,
and to help the client with car payments. The court emphasized the importance of the attorney remaining friendly with an indispensable witness. Id. at
381-82, 134 N.E.2d at 328.
59. 194 Kan. 362, 399 P.2d 865 (1965).
60. Id. at 374-75, 399 P.2d at 874-75.
61. Id.
62. The court concluded that the mere bulk of cases in which bank loans
were secured for clients (67 out of 312 railroad accident claims; 67 out of 8600
total claims handled during the period involved) did not prove that the attor-

ney's practice of securing loans was known to prospective clients. Id. at 374,
399 P.2d at 875.
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bands.63 The court, adopting the rationale articulated in
Opinion 288, held that the loans violated canons 10 and 42.64 On
the same facts, the district court for the Northern District of
Ohio refused to find the attorney's conduct improper. 65 The
court reasoned that canon 42 neither implicitly nor explicitly
dealt with loans for living expenses, 6 6 and held that the attorney had not made a purchase in violation of canon 10.67 The

court observed that the evidence of the client's unconditional
obligation to repay the attorney was uncontroverted; 68 moreover, the court noted that the loans, which were not substantial
in amount, were made to relatively few clients and only at their
69
request after they had retained counsel.
Despite the confusion in the courts, when the American
Bar Association adopted the Model Code of Professional Responsibility in 196970 the ABA did not include a rule dealing explicitly with loans for living expenses, although such a rule had
been requested. 71 The Model Code essentially codified Opinion
288's interpretation of canon 42 in DR 5-103(B),72 allowing advances or guarantees for the "expenses of litigation," such as
"court costs, expenses of investigation, expenses of medical examination, and costs of obtaining and presenting evidence." 73
Because the rule does not purport to be an exclusive enumera63. Mahoning County Bar Ass'n v. Ruffalo, 176 Ohio St. 263, 265, 199 N.E.2d

396, 398, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 931 (1964).
64. Id. The court found that the only reasonable source of repayment was
the'proceeds of the suit and that the attorney therefore purchased an interest
in the subject matter of the litigation in violation of canon 10. The court concluded that under canon 42, such a purchase was permissible only if the advance was for "expenses of litigation." Id. at 264-65, 199 N.E.2d at 398; see supra
notes 30, 37.
65. In re Ruffalo, 249 F. Supp. 432, 442 (N.D. Ohio 1965).
66. Id.
67. Id. The court, noting the lack of evidence concerning the clients' ability
to repay the attorney with funds other than those received at trial or settlement, rejected the Ohio court's inference that such repayment was impossible.
Id. at 443.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrTY (1969), incorporated by
reference, MINN. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIZrrY, 286 Minn. ix (1970).
Although the Association subsequently amended its Rules of Professional Responsibility, see MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIB=rrY (1980), the current loan provisions are identical to their 1969 counterparts. Minnesota's loan
provisions remained unchanged until their recent amendment. See supra note
2 and accompanying text.
71. See Note, supra note 31, at 1421.
72. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY DR 5-103(B) (1980).
73. Id.; see supra note 4.
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tion of allowable expenses,7 4 the scope of permissible financial
assistance is unclear. Similarly, in DR 5-103(A), the Model
Code prohibits an attorney from acquiring a proprietary interest in the subject matter of the litigation.7 5 Although the Association neglected to define explicitly the nature of the
forbidden interest,7 6 the rule tacitly clarifies the scope of forbidden conduct by providing two notable exceptions; the rule
allows an attorney to acquire a lien granted by law to secure a
fee or expenses and to contract for a reasonable contingent
77
fee.
The Model Code implicitly adopts the Committee's conclusions in Opinion 288 that subsistence loans might create a conflict of interest between an attorney and client and that such
loans are an improper inducement to employment.7 8 In its Ethical Considerations, 7 9 the Model Code provides that a lawyer's
professional judgment should be exercised solely for the benefit of the client, undiluted by other interests, including the attorney's own.80 The Model Code therefore advises attorneys
74. DR 5-103(B) provides that "a lawyer may advance or guarantee the expenses of litigation, including court costs, expenses of investigation, expenses
of medical examination, and costs of obtaining and presenting evidence."
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSMILITY DR 5-103(B) (1980) (emphasis
added). See supra note 4. The rule does not indicate that the list is intended to
be exhaustive as opposed to simply illustrative.
75. MODEL CODE OF PROFEssIONAL RESPONSBIlTY DR 5-103(A) (1980). DR
5-103(A) provides:
[a] lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of litigation he is conducting for a client, except
that he may:
(1) Acquire a lien granted by law to secure his fee or expenses.
(2) Contract with a client for a reasonable contingent fee in a civil

case.
Id.; cf. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETmIcs No. 10 (1908) (prohibiting
purchasing of interest); supra note 30.
76. Read literally, DR 5-103(A) prohibits the acquisition of an interest in
the right that one claims against another, such as the right to recover money.
See generally Flower Hosp. v. Hart, 178 Okla. 447, 450-51, 62 P.2d 1248, 1252
(1936) (defining "subject matter").
77. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSILITY DR 5-103(A) (1980).
This type of conduct would be more accurately identified as the acquisition of
an interest in the proceeds of the litigation, rather than the acquisition of an
interest in the subject matter of the litigation.
78. See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
79. According to the Code's Preliminary Statement, the Ethical Considerations are not mandatory, but are "aspirational in character and represent the
objectives toward which every member of the profession should strive." MODEL
CODE OF PRoFEsSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Preamble and Preliminary Statement

(1980).
80. See id. EC 5-1, which provides:
The professional judgment of a lawyer should be exercised, within the
bounds of the law, solely for the benefit of his client and free of corn-
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against acquiring a proprietary interest in a client's cause,8 1 advancing money to clients, 82 or otherwise becoming financially
interested in the outcome of the litigation.83 In addition, the
Ethical Considerations 84 under canon 285 suggest that any practice, particularly if publicized, may be improper if it either directly or indirectly influences a client to retain a particular
86
attorney.
In states that adopted the Model Code, courts regularly
held that loans were improper if they were made for any pur87
pose other than satisfying the actual expenses of litigation.
In Louisiana State Bar Association v. Edwins,88 however, the
Louisiana Supreme Court permitted a subsistence loan. 8 9 The
court observed that although DR 5-103(B) included a list of permitted expenses, the rule did not apparently exclude other expenses "similarly necessary to permit the client his day in
court."9 0 Because the rule was ambiguous, the court relied on
case law prior to Opinion 288 to support its conclusion that advances for living expenses were proper.9 1
Three other states, in addition to Louisiana, allow loans for
92
living expenses. California's Rules of Professional Conduct
promising influences and loyalties. Neither his personal interests, the
interests of other clients, nor the desires of third persons should be
permitted to dilute his loyalty to his client.
Id.; see id. EC 5-7.
81. I& EC 5-7.
82. Id. EC 5-8.
83. Id. EC 5-7.
84. Id. EC 2-1 to 2-30. See also id. EC 2-31 to 2-33.
85. Model Code of Professional Responsibility canon 2 provides that "[a]
lawyer should assist the legal profession in fulfilling its duty to make legal
counsel available." Id. Canon 2.
86. See id. EC 2-1 to 2-30.
87. In re Carroll, 124 Ariz. 80, 85-86, 602 P.2d 461, 466-67 (1979); In re Stewart, 121 Ariz. 243, 245, 589 P.2d 886, 888 (1979); Bar Ass'n of Baltimore City v.
Cockrell, 270 Md. 686, 690, 313 A.2d 816, 818 (1974); In re Pusser, 273 S.C. 115, 116,
254 S.E.2d 926, 926 (1979); In re Reaves, 272 S.C. 213, 217, 250 S.E.2d 329, 330
(1978).
88. 329 So.2d 437 (La. 1976).
89. Id. at 445-47.
90. Id. at 446.
91. Id. The court noted that none of the dangers identified in Opinion 288
were present, because the client received the loan after retaining the attorney,
the client remained liable for repayment, the loans were reasonably necessary,
and the attorney did not publicize the availability of the loans. Id.
92. (A) A member of the State Bar shall not directly or indirectly pay
or agree to pay, guarantee, or represent or sanction the representation
that he will pay personal or business expenses incurred by or for a client, prospective or existing and shall not prior to his employment enter
into any discussion or other communication with a prospective client
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and Alabama's Code of Professional Responsibility93 allow an
9 5
94
attorney to provide financial assistance for living expenses
if the loan is made after the attorney's retention and the client
is liable for repayment of the loan. Texas, which did not adopt
DR 5-103(B), also allows subsistence loans in appropriate circumstances. 9 6 In addition, the Proposed Final Draft of the
American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct 97 permits a lawyer to advance living expenses to a client. 98
regarding any such payments or agreements to pay; provided this rule
shall not prohibit a member
(2) after he has been employed, from lending money to his client
upon the client's promise in writing to repay such loan;
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA Rule 5-

104(A) (2) (1974).
93. (B) While representing a client in connection with contemplated
or pending litigation, a lawyer may advance or guarantee emergency
financial assistance to his client, provided that the client remains ultimately liable for such assistance without regard to the outcome of the
litigation and, further provided, that no promise of such financial
assistance was made to the client by the lawyer, or by another in his
behalf, prior to the employment of that lawyer by that client.
ALABAMA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsIBULIY DR 5-103(B) (1975).

94. Both the California and Alabama rules allow an attorney to advance or
guarantee financial assistance. The Alabama Code specifically allows such actions and the California Rules implicitly embrace both methods by providing
that an attorney may lend money to a client. See supra.notes 92-93.
95. Neither the Alabama nor the California rules explicitly state the extent
of permissible financial assistance. The Alabama Code allows an attorney to
extend "emergency" financial assistance. The California Rules do not limit an
attorney's lending activities to a stated purpose, presumably permitting loans
for any reason. See supra notes 92-93.
96. See State Bar of Texas, Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 230
(1959). In 1954, the Committee on Professional Ethics of the State Bar of Texas
issued Formal Opinion 106, condemning advances for living expenses in order
for an attorney to retain employment. State Bar of Texas, Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 106 (1954). Formal Opinion 230 modified this position.
While advances to prospective clients for the purpose of obtaining employment
were considered improper, advances after employment were permissible unless the advances were made "with such publicity, frequency or notoriety as to
constitute indirect solicitation of employment in other matters." State Bar of
Texas, Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 230 (1959). The committee
also stated that repayment from the proceeds of the claim did not affect the
propriety of the loan, implying that ultimate repayment was necessary. Id.
97. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Proposed Final Draft 1981),

reprinted in 67 A.B.A. J. 1299 (1981).
98. Rule 1.8(e) (1) provides:
(e) A lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to a client in connection with pending or contemplated litigation, except that:
(1) A lawyer may advance court costs, expenses of litigation, and
reasonable and necessary medical and living expenses, the repayment of which may be contingent on the outcome of the matter;
Id. Rule 1.8(e) (1), reprinted in 67 A.B.A. J. 1299, 1310 (1981).

1982]

ETHICAL LOAN GUARANTEES

1103

The proposed rule suggests that the timing of the loan agreement is irrelevant, 99 and provides that repayment of the loan
may be contingent on the outcome of the litigation.100
IlI.

DR 5-103(B) (2)-THE NEW MINNESOTA RULE

In 1981, the Minnesota Supreme Court, upon petition by
the Minnesota Lawyers' Professional Responsibility Board,
amended DR 5-103(B) to allow an attorney to guarantee loans
that are reasonably necessary to relieve substantial financial
pressure on a client to settle.10 ' The amendment, with some
variation,102 restores the original common law rule on subsistence loans.

A. ETHICAL PROBLEMS OF FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO CUENTS
The Minnesota Supreme Court correctly determined that
the practice of guaranteeing loans to needy clients is consistent
with sound professional ethics. Although the Code discourages
arrangements that may create a conflict of interest103 between
the attorney and the client and may improperly influence the
client's choice of counsel,104 these concerns do not justify a
complete prohibition of financial assistance for living expenses.
The Ethical Considerations state that an attorney should avoid
becoming financially interested in the outcome of the suit, because the interest may impair an attorney's ability to exercise
professional judgment on behalf of a client. 0 5 By identifying
impermissible interests as financial or proprietary, the Code
implies that a conflict of interest may arise when an attorney
99. The rule refers to financial assistance to "a client," implying that the
actual loan is proper only after the attorney's retention. Unlike the California
and Alabama rules, however, the Model Rules do not explicitly prohibit discussion and agreement concerning financial assistance with a potential client.
100. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(e) (1) (Proposed Final Draft 1981), reprintedin 67 A.B.A. J. 1299, 1310 (1981).
101. See supra note 3.
102. The common law allowed an attorney to advance money for living expenses, provided the client remained liable for repayment despite the outcome
of the lawsuit and the loan was made after the attorney's retention. See .supra
notes 16-27 and accompanying text. The amendment simply allows an attorney
to guarantee a loan subject to the same common law provisos. In addition to
varying the form of permissible financial assistance, the language in the
amendment may broaden the scope of permissible financial assistance beyond
mere living expenses. See infra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
103. See MINN. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-7, EC 5-8, 9
MINN.STAT. 728 (1980).
104. See .supra note 79-86 and accompanying text.
105. MINN. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsIBnY EC 5-7, 9 MINN.STAT. 728

(1980).
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commits any of his or her financial resources in prosecuting a
client's claim. The drafters apparently feared that attorneys
might subordinate their clients' best interests to their own interests to protect their financial interest in the lawsuit. Nevertheless, the Ethical Considerations106 and the Disciplinary
Rules,107 by sanctioning advances for litigation expenses and
contingent fees, recognize that the need for access to the judicial system may outweigh the conflict of interest problem. The
Code thus allows an attorney to commit some of his or her own
resources to a case,1 08 even if the proceeds from judgment or
settlement provide the sole source of repayment,109 because if
these practices were prohibited a needy client might be unable
to raise the funds necessary to litigate the claim.110
An attorney who guarantees a loan to a client for living expenses acquires an interest similar to that acquired by a permissible advance or guarantee of the expenses of litigation."'
In either situation, the proceeds of the suit may provide the
source of repayment. But the loan might be repaid from subsequently available funds, despite the client's desperate financial
condition at the time of the loan." 2 In contrast to a loan for the
expenses of litigation, however, a guaranteed loan for living expenses may eventually involve a substantial commitment of the
attorney's resources to the client's cause of action. Court costs,
witness fees, and investigation expenses will seldom match the
considerable expense of maintaining the client through a
lengthy lawsuit. Moreover, an attorney guaranteeing a loan for
living expenses will usually advance the litigation expenses
also. Because an attorney's inclination to protect his or her
financial interest presumably increases with the size of the interest, guaranteeing a loan for living expenses may arguably
106. Id. EC 5-7, EC 5-8, 9 MNI. STAT. 728 (1980).
107. Id. DR 5-103, 9 MN. STAT. 731 (1980).
108. Id. DR 5-103(B)(1), 52 MIINN. STAT. ANN. 21 (West Supp. 1982); see
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBiITY DR 5-103(B) (1980).
109. MMN. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONsmLrrY DR 5-103(A) (2) (1980), 9
MmN.STAT. 731 (1980).
110. Id. EC 5-7, EC 5-8, 9 MwIN. STAT. 728 (1980).
111. The Code has always allowed an attorney to advance or guarantee the
expenses of litigation while representing a client. See id. DR 5-103(B), 9 MINN.
STAT. 731 (1980); supra note 4. The interests acquired by advancing or guaran-

teeing the expense of litigation does not appear to be a "proprietary interest"
within the meaning of DR 5-103(A). See supra note 75.
112. See Bar Ass'n of the City of New York, Comm. on Professional Ethics,
Op. 781 (1953) (client was a seaman and could easily repay the loan with his
wages once he returned to work).
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present a greater conflict of interest problem than simply advancing the expenses of litigation.
The Code's treatment of contingent fees, however, demonstrates that a substantial investment in a client's cause of action does not support a presumption that the attorney has
acquired an interest in the litigation that creates an impermissible conflict of interest. Little practical difference may exist
between allowing an attorney to commit his or her time pursuant to a contingent fee arrangement and allowing an attorney
to commit his or her money pursuant to a loan guarantee. Because an attorney presumably could bill his or her time at an
hourly rate, an attorney retained under a contingent fee arrangement in effect loans the client an amount equal to the
normal fee for the number of hours devoted to the case. By
permitting contingent fee contracts, the Code condones a substantial investment by an attorney in appropriate circumstances. An attorney's guaranteed loan may be as essential to
a litigant's ability to pursue a cause of action as a contingent
fee arrangement. Public policy thu supports the propriety of
both practices.
Of course, a contingent fee arrangement can be distinguished from a loan in that, under the former, the attorney will
not receive compensation for his or her time if the suit is unsuccessful. A client's liability for a subsistence loan continues,
however, even if the suit fails, and the client must repay the
loan despite the absence of proceeds from the lawsuit. Nevertheless, in some instances, a client may be unable to pay unless
the suit is successful. Since an attorney is unlikely to advance
either the time or the credit a client requires to pursue a claim
if the attorney believes that success is unlikely, investing either
resource creates an equivalent potential for a conflict of interest. To the extent that the attorney's recovery of fees or liability on the loan depends upon the successful resolution of the
lawsuit, the attorney's and the client's interests are in accord
3
under either a contingent fee or a loan guarantee."
113. In at least one situation, however, a loanmaking attorney may have a
greater incentive to pursue his or her own interests at the client's expense than
an attorney operating under a contingent fee arrangement. If an attorney believes that the ultimate recovery will only be enough to satisfy the outstanding
loan, the attorney will want to settle the suit for any amount that is sufficient to
repay the loan. Because the client gains little from such a settlement, he or she

would prefer to gamble on the possibility of a larger recovery at trial. By contrast, under a contingent fee contract, the attorney's compensation is a percent-

age of the ultimate recovery, and both attorney and client have the same
interest in maximizing the proceeds of the suit. Nevertheless, it seems unlikely
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Thus, guaranteeing a loan for living expenses will not impair a scrupulous attorney's allegiance to a client to any greater
extent than a contingent fee arrangement; the potential conflict
of interest is similar under both practices. As with the other
practices permitted by the Code, any conflict of interest associated with loan guarantees is offset by the benefits of greater access to the judicial process for litigants with limited resources.
The availability of financial assistance also does not violate
the Code's policy against improper influence of a client's choice
of counsel. Guaranteeing loans is not an improper inducement
to employment, but simply a factor that a potential client may
consider in choosing his or her attorney. Perhaps in the ideal
situation, a potential client should select an attorney based
solely on the client's personal knowledge of the attorney's professional competence." 4 Both the Minnesota Code and the
Model Code, however, recognize the limited efficacy of the
traditional selection process employed by potential clients.11 5
To facilitate the process of informed selection, the Model Code
provides a compilation of information that a lawyer, subject to
certain restrictions, may publish or broadcast." 6 This compilation includes fee and credit information." 7 Allowing and encouraging" 8 the dissemination of specified information clearly
implies that the Model Code recognizes factors other than the
that an attorney would accept the case if his or her compensation were limited
to repayment of any amounts loaned to the client. For a further discussion of
this problem, see infra note 129.
114. EC 2-6 provides: "Formerly a potential client usually knew the reputations of local lawyers for competency and integrity and therefore could select a
practitioner in whom he had confidence. This traditional selection process
worked well because it was initiated by the client and the choice was an informed one." MINN. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONsmIu'r EC 2-6, 9 MINN.
STAT. 715 (1980); cf.ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHcs No. 27 (advertising,
direct or indirect); .upra note 34.
115. MnN. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmILr

EC 2-7, 9 MINN. STAT. 715
(1980). The Model Code differs slightly from the Minnesota Code by recognizing that lack of information about lawyers and "the expense of legal representation leads laypersons to avoid seeking legal advice." MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-7 (1980).
116. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(B) (1980).

The Minnesota Code, unlike the Model Code, does not provide a list of the
types of information a lawyer may publish or broadcast. See MINN. CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBmrrY DR 2-101(B), 9 MINE. STAT. 719 (1980).
117. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsiBmry DR 2-101 (B) (18), (20)-

(25) (1980).
118. Model Code EC 2-8 provides: "Selection of a lawyer by a layperson
should' be made on an informed basis. Advice and recommendation of third
parties ... and disclosures of relevant information about the lawyer and his
practice may be helpful." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-

8 (1980).
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attorney's professional competence" 9 as legitimate considerations for potential clients. 20 Much of this information, such as
fee schedules, hourly rates, and the availability of contingent
fee arrangements, relates to a potential client's financial ability
to retain a particular attorney.' 2 ' Because the availability of
financial assistance during litigation is relevant to a client's
choice of counsel, its consideration should be as permissible as
the consideration of other kinds of financial information that attorneys may currently publish under the Model Code.
The Minnesota Code attempts to limit the influence of loan
guarantees on a client's employment decision by forbidding the
attorney to promise a guarantee before the client hires the attorney. 2 2 This timing distinction is artificial because the timing of the loan does not significantly reduce its influence on the
client's decision to retain counsel. If a client requires financial
assistance to pursue his or her claim, the availability of such
assistance will be an essential consideration whether the client
considers it before or after the retention of an attorney. Requiring that the attorney inform -the client of its availability
only after retention fosters uninformed decision making by the
client and leads to the useless retention and dismissal of attorneys that cannot or will not provide the financial assistance
that the client requires. Besides being inappropriate and superfluous, the requirement that the loan agreement be initiated
after retention is difficult, if not impossible, to enforce. Although the Minnesota rule seems to prohibit guaranteeing a
loan prior to retention of counsel, the rule does not prohibit an
attorney from discussing the availability of a guaranteed
loan. 23 Thus, as drafted, the rule is consistent with informed
decision making.
119. Information that may be publicized pursuant to Model Code DR 2101(B) includes that which is relevant to the issue of the attorney's professional competence. See upra note 117 and accompanying text.
120. The Minnesota Code arguably permits the communication of financial
information, provided the statement is not false, fraudulent, misleading, or deceptive. See MINN. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIILITY DR 2-101(B), 9
MINN. STAT. 719 (1980).
121. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESpONsmIu'rY DR 2-101(B)(18),

(20)-(25) (1979).
122. MMN. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-103(B) (2), 52 MmN.
STAT. ANN. 21 (West Supp. 1982).
123. Cf.RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF THE STATE BAR or CALIFoRIA
Rule 5-104(A) (2) (1974) (prohibiting discussions); supra note 92.
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ENSURING THE PROPRIETY OF GUARANTEED LOANS

Guaranteeing loans, although justified on policy grounds,
may unduly inhibit a client from exercising control over a lawsuit.124 For example, a client receiving financial assistance for
living expenses from the attorney might be reluctant to dis-

charge the attorney 125 or to accept a settlement offer which the
attorney thinks is inadequate 126 because the client might feel
psychologically and morally indebted to the attorney. In addition, it seems likely that in many cases a client who needs a
loan for living expenses will retain counsel under a contingent
fee arrangement127 which may create additional problems. Because the attorney has more invested in the suit, he or she potentially has a greater stake in the outcome of the litigation.128

The greater investment may increase the attorney's possible inclination to protect his or her interest at the expense of the client's interest. 129 An unscrupulous attorney could also use the
suggestion of a loan for living expenses to induce a needy client
to accept a contingent fee contract that promised the attorney
an excessive percentage of the ultimate proceeds.
To minimize the potential for these problems, an attorney
should guarantee loans for living expenses only when a client
genuinely needs assistance, and the amount loaned should not
exceed the client's reasonable living expenses.130 Disciplinary
124. See generally MIEN. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrTY EC 5-1, EC

7-7, EC 7-8, EC 7-9, 9 MmN. STAT. 727, 735 (1980) (general admonitions to attorneys that the client should make ultimate decisions about the case).
125. See, e.g., Fluhr v. Roberts, 463 F. Supp. 745, 747 (W.D. Ky. 1979) (attorney-client relationship may always be terminated by the client with or without
cause).
126. See, e.g., Kotsifakis v. A. Lusi, Ltd., 138 F. Supp. 945, 947 (E.D. Va. 1955)
(client controls the acceptance or rejection of a settlement offer).
127. Because a client who needs a loan to withstand a delay in litigation will
rarely have the financial resources to retain an attorney, the attorney will often
be operating under a contingent fee contract. The loan may be appropriate,
however, in domestic relations cases, where a contingent fee is not proper. See
MINE. CODE OF PRoFEssIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-20, 9 MwNm.STAT. 717 (1980).

128. See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
129. For example, a loanmaking attorney might accept a settlement adequate to insure the attorney's reimbursement but too small to compensate the
client adequately. This, however, is not likely. Although the attorney negotiates for and advises the client, the attorney cannot accept or reject a settlement
offer without the client's consent. See supra note 126. Furthermore, the attorney is unlikely even to encourage the client's acceptance of an inadequate settlement offer because the loan in many cases will have been made to enable
the client to reject an inadequate settlement offer. See supra text accompanying note 27.
130. In McCallum, the Supreme Court of Illinois recognized that the purpose of advances for living expenses was to prevent acceptance of an unjust
settlement offer out of financial necessity. The court allowed advances for liv-
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Rule 5-103(B) (2) limits the availability of guaranteed loans to
those situations in which a loan is "reasonably needed to enable the client to withstand delay in litigation that would otherwise put substantial pressure on the client to settle a case
because of financial hardship rather than on the merits."' 3 1
The phrases "reasonably needed," "substantial pressure," and
"financial hardship," however, invite varied and manipulative
interpretations. The new rule provides inadequate guidance in
determining precisely what the requisite necessity is under the
amendment. 3 2 Because of these ambiguities, the Minnesota
Lawyer's Professional Responsibility Board (Board) should
consider issuing an opinion clarifying the requisite standard of
necessity. Prohibiting an attorney from guaranteeing loans for
living expenses until the client has attempted to obtain an unguaranteed loan through ordinary commercial channels is one
way to ensure the client's necessity. If a client's loan application is rejected, the rejection notice provides adequate assurance that the client's circumstances require the attorney's
guarantee. To ensure the attorney's ability to respond to an
ing expenses and hospital bills to clients who were unable to work, had no
money or property, and whose only assets were their claim for damages. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. McCallum, 341 Ill. 578, 589, 173 N.E. 827, 831
(1930). The Supreme Court of Louisiana seemed to adopt a similar standard of
necessity in Edwins: "If an improverished person is unable to secure subsistence from some source during disability, he may be deprived of the only effective means by which he can wait out the necessary delays that result from
litigation to enforce his cause of action." Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Edwins,
329 So. 2d 437, 446 (La. 1976). Yet, the court concluded that the money advances made by the attorney to his client were proper, although used to
purchase tires, make monthly car payments, cover the cost of the client's hospitalization and operation in connection with a non-accident related painful condition, and pay hotel expenses to enable the client's wife to be nearby during
his hospitalization. Id. at 444.
131. MnN. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrY DR 5-103(B)(2), 52 MINN.
STAT. ANN. 21 (West Supp. 1982).
132. The use of undefined ambiguous terms such as "reasonably needed,"
"substantial pressure," and "financial hardship" requires a subjective analysis.
An injured plaintiff, unable to work, who cannot provide adequate food and
shelter for his or her family without assistance undoubtedly needs a guaranteed loan within the meaning of the amendment. A more affluent client, however, may feel "substantial pressure" to settle a case because of "financial
hardship" under entirely different circumstances. For example, to meet immediate financial obligations, a client might face the choice of selling his or her
business or accepting a settlement offer. It is unclear whether such a dilemma
would be regarded as "substantial pressure" to settle because of 'inancial
hardship," and it is arguable whether a guaranteed loan is "reasonably needed"
in this situation. Whether the amendment adopts the strict McCallum standard of necessity on the basis of physical need or the less stringent standard in
Edwins encompassing general economic need is also unclear. See supra note
130. Because only physical needs are truly essential, the use of the modifier
"reasonably" implies the adoption of the latter standard.
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emergency situation, the Code should permit the attorney to
make a small loan immediately, pending the client's unsuccessful attempt at independent financing.
The new rule also limits the loan to the amount necessary
to withstand delay in litigation, 3 3 but the time required to constitute delay under the rule is unclear. Loan guarantees might
be permissible during the ordinarily lengthy process of instituting, pursuing, and completing a lawsuit, but delay could be interpreted to require time in excess of that ordinarily involved.
Whether the delay must have occurred prior to the loan agreement or whether a reasonable expectation of delay is adequate
is also unclear. Loan guarantees are intended to prevent settlement solely on the basis of the client's immediate financial
need.134 If the requisite necessity is present, the Board should
interpret the amendment to permit the attorney to guarantee
the client's loan immediately upon his or her retention.135
The new rule specifies that an attorney may not directly
loan a client funds for living expenses; such assistance must
take the form of a loan guarantee. 3 6 This restriction is desirable in light of the severe feeling of indebtedness that might result from a direct loan, possibly inhibiting the client's control of
the suit.137 The attorney serves the same function whether act-

ing as lender or guarantor-providing financial assistance to a
client who without such assistance would be unable to pursue
a claim. In either capacity, the attorney assumes an identical
risk. 3 8 Yet some of the potential dangers inherent in direct
loans are minimized through the use of loan guarantees. The
client's legal obligation to a third party eliminates the psychological impact of receiving money directly from the attorney; a
loan guarantee thus may reduce the client's feeling of indebt133. See supra note 3.
134. See IMNN. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIITY DR 5-103(B)(2), 52
MiNN. STAT. ANN. 21 (West Supp. 1982).
135. The California Code, the Alabama Code, and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Proposed Final Draft), all of which allow some form of
financial assistance for living expenses, do not incorporate a delay requirement.
See supra notes 92-93, 98.
136. MINN. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-103(B) (2), 52 MIEN.
STAT. ANw. 21 (West Supp. 1982). The California Code, the Alabama Code, and
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Proposed Final Draft) allow attorneys to make direct loans to their clients. See supra notes 92-93, 98.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 125-26.
138. If the client is unable to repay the direct loan, the lending attorney will
simply not be repaid. The guaranteeing attorney will be responsible to the
lending party for repayment, and similarly will have no one but the client to
look to for repayment.
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edness and resultant reluctance to exercise the right of control
over the cause of action. In addition, the formalities associated
with a guaranteed loan-third party participation and the legal
forms and procedures-will help ensure that the client has
carefully considered the decision to accept the loan and to pursue the claim.
The rule correctly incorporates the common law requirement that the client remain "ultimately liable for repayment of
the loan without regard to the outcome of the litigation."13 9 Although the outcome of the lawsuit should not determine the client's liability on the loan obligation, the words "ultimately
liable" are somewhat ambiguous. Cases will surely arise where
the lender, unable to collect from the client, demands payment
from the attorney. It is clear that the Code should not require
an attorney to proceed against the client to hold the client "ultimately liable."140 The practice would be unseemly and, in most
circumstances where guaranteed loans are necessary, collection efforts would be futile.
Drafting the loan agreement as a conditional guarantee14 1
would enhance the efficacy of the amendment's repayment requirement without requiring an attorney to attempt to enforce
the client's obligation. A conditional agreement would require
that the lender exercise due diligence in attempting to collect
the debt from the client.142 Only if the lender's diligent efforts
43
were unsuccessful would the guarantee bind the attorney.1
The attorney need not proceed against the client except in
those rare instances in which the lender was unsuccessful and
139. MINN. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILrrY DR 5-103(B)(2), 52 MINN.
STAT. ANN. 21 (West Supp. 1982). The purpose of this requirement is unclear.

Repayment was traditionally required to prevent attorneys from prosecuting
questionable claims and from taking advantage of their superior ability to eval-

uate claims for the purpose of speculative litigation. See supra notes 21-22 and
accompanying text. Requiring repayment to discourage the assertion and litigation of questionable claims is unnecessary. Not only do the present Codes
forbid lawyers from engaging in frivolous suits, but the time and expense involved in litigating a claim discourages both attorneys and potential claimants
from instigating questionable suits. See MINN. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONsiBuzry DR 2-109, DR 2-110 (B) (1), 9 MAmN. STAT. 722, 740 (1980).
140. See MINN. CODE OF PRoFEssIoNAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-23, 9 MINN.
STAT. ANN. 717 (1980).

141. A conditional guaranty is not enforceable immediately upon the principal debtor's default, but only upon the happening of some stated contingency,
such as suit against the principal debtor or exhaustion of security. See, e.g.,
Dahmes v. Industrial Credit Co., 261 Minn. 26, 33, 110 N.W.2d 484, 489 (1961).
142. See, e.g., Pavlantos v. Garoufalis, 89 F.2d 203, 206 (10th Cir. 1937).

143. Id.
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the circumstances justified the suit. 4 4
Conditioning loan guarantees on specified criteria does not
ensure compliance with the rule's limitations on ethical
loanmaking.
The Board must enforce the limitations on
permissible financial assistance imposed by DR 5-103(B) (2).
According to Minnesota's Rules of Lawyers Professional Responsibility,145 the Board may investigate any lawyer either
46
with or without a specific complaint of alleged misconduct.1
In the absence of a specific complaint, the Director of the Board
(Director) may initiate an investigation at any time.147 Most
disciplinary agencies, however, although authorized to institute
investigations, rarely use this authority, possibly because of inadequate staff or funds, the absence of sources of information
other than specific complaints, or the absence of initiative.148
The principle impetus for the enforcement of ethical standards,
therefore, is the specific complaint.
Specific complaints require the cooperation of either the attorney who acted as guarantor, the lending party, another attorney who is aware of the financial arrangement, or the client
who received the loan. The Board cannot rely on any of these
sources of specific complaints to ensure adequately that loans
are guaranteed only under appropriate circumstances. Because the vague language of DR 5-103(B) (2) provides limited
guidance,14 9 an attorney attempting to remain within the scope
of permissible conduct will require supervision.150 The lending
party is under no obligation to report unethical conduct to the
Board and will have no incentive to do so. 5 1 Another attorney
144. See MIN. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrY EC 2-23, 9 MINN.
STAT. 717 (1980).
145. MINN. RULES ON LAWYERS PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 2, 9
MINN. STAT. 750 (1980). The Rules on Lawyers Professional Responsibility gov-

ern the investigations of lawyers' alleged unprofessional conduct and the disciplinary proceedings brought as a result of the investigations.
146. .Id. Rule 8(b), 9 MINN.STAT. 752 (1980).
147. Id.
148. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON EVALUATION OF
DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, PROBLEMS AND RECOMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY
ENFORCEMENT 60 (1970) [hereinafter cited as DiscIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT].

149.

See supra text accompanying notes 131-33.

150.

The amendment's insufficient guidance as to the scope of permissible

financial assistance is particularly disturbing in light of the mandatory character of the disciplinary rules. According to the Code's Preliminary Statement,
the Disciplinary Rules provide "the minimum level of conduct below which no
lawyer can fall without being subject to disciplinary action." MINN. CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Preliminary Statement, 9 MINN.STAT. 712 (1980).
151. The lending party, anxious to make guaranteed loans, may actually
have a disincentive to report unethical conduct, particularly because as the client's need becomes more tenuous and therefore the possibility of a violation
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who is aware of the financial arrangement, although obligated
to report unethical conduct,152 is also unlikely to make a report
since attorneys are often reluctant to complain about their colleagues.1 53 In addition, an attorney who is aware of the
financial arrangement is likely to be the guarantor's partner or
associate 54 and therefore even more reluctant to report the potentially unethical conduct. Clients receiving the loans will
provide the best, although an inadequate, source of specific
complaints. If a client is dissatisfied with the attorney's performance or the ultimate outcome of the lawsuit, he or she may
file a complaint with the Board.15 5 In many instances, however,
the loan ultimately benefits the client, and he or she will have
56
no reason to report improper loan guarantees.1
Because specific complaints inadequately ensure effective
enforcement of DR 5-103(B) (2), the Director. must initiate independent investigations of potentially unethical loanmaking
activity. To facilitate this process, the Board should develop an
independent and reliable source of information about loan
guarantees made pursuant to DR 5-103(B) (2).'57 The Board
could draft a standard loan agreement, which the parties would
increases, the lender's risk of either a lengthy collection procedure or an ultimate loss decreases.
152. "A lawyer possessing unprivileged knowledge of a violation of [a disciplinary rule] shall report such knowledge to a tribunal or other authority empowered to investigate or act upon such violation." MINN. CODE OF
PROFEssIONAL REspONsmnirY DR I-103(A), 9 MIm. STAT. 714 (1980).
153. DIsciPLmNARY ENFORCEMENT, supra note 148, at 167.
154. Perhaps unintentionally, the client might mention the financial arrangement to another attorney, who is neither a partner nor an associate of the
guarantor, who might be less reluctant to report the guarantor's unethical conduct. The Special Committee on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement, however, identified the reluctance to inform as "almost universal." Id. at 168.
155. Although a dissatisfied client may be unaware of the existence of DR 5103(B) (2) and therefore unaware of its violation, the Board, upon receiving a
complaint and investigating the relationship, would be likely to discover the
violation.
156. The client's lack of incentive to report unethical conduct is a problem
whenever the attorney's misconduct benefits the client. This is true, for example, in the case of the falsification of personal injury claims and immigration
frauds to enable noneligible aliens to gain admission to the country. See DisciPLIARY ENFORCEMENT, supra note 148, at 6.
157. In 1928, Justice Wasservogel of the New York Supreme Court, after investigating the abuses of the contingent fee, concluded that the contingent fee
should not be prohibited because to do so would deny justice to many poor
claimants with meritorious claims. He suggested, however, that the courts supervise all contingent retainers in order to protect claimants in their relations
with attorneys. Justice Wasservogel's recommendation that the court require
the filing of retainer agreements was adopted. F. MAcKINNON, CONTINGENT
FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES, A STUDY OF PROFESsIONAL EcoNoMIcs AND RESPONsm 'rnEs161-62 (1964).
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use whenever an attorney acts as a guarantor. The agreement
would require the parties to supply specific information regarding the client's financial need. To ensure that the Board received a copy of the agreement, the promissory note could
provide that the attorney's guarantee was not binding prior to
filing with the Board. The lender would therefore have a strong
incentive to file a copy of the agreement with the Board.15 8 In
addition, by charging a filing fee, the Board could recoup a portion of the cost of regulating loan guarantees. This proposal, requiring a minimum of inconvenience and expense, would
provide an adequate source of information upon which the
Board could initiate investigations of potentially unethical
financial assistance.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Minnesota Supreme Court correctly amended the
Code of Professional Responsibility to allow an attorney to
guarantee a loan where reasonably necessary to relieve substantial pressure on the client to settle. Loan guarantees present no greater potential for conflicts of interest than other
practices permitted by the Code. In addition, the availability of
financial assistance for living expenses is not an improper inducement to the employment of an attorney. Nevertheless,
financial assistance may adversely affect the attorney-client relationship by making the client feel unduly indebted to the attorney. In addition, because a client who needs a loan may
have retained counsel pursuant to a contingent fee contract,
the combination of the two arrangements may cause the attorney to subordinate the client's interests to his or her interests.
Unfortunately, the amended rule provides inadequate guidance
for attorneys who wish to minimize those problems. The Board
should therefore consider exercising its discretionary authority
to issue opinions on questions of professional conduct to clarify
the scope and method of permissible financial assistance. The
Board should also consider requiring attorneys to file copies of
the loan guarantee agreements to facilitate enforcement of the
ethical limitations on such guarantees.

158. Requiring the lawyer or the client to file would be self-defeating. In
the situation in which neither the attorney nor the client has an incentive to
complain of unethical conduct, neither party will have an incentive to file a record of the unethical guaranteed loan.

